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NOTES
PENAL CODE REFORM IN INDIANA: PIECEMEAL AMENDMENT
IS NOT THE ANSWER
If penal law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in
jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works gross
injustice to those caught within its toils. The law that carries
such responsibilities should surely be as rational and just as law
can be. Nowhere in the entire field is more at stake for the
community or for the individual.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The above passage by Professor Wechsler in no way overstates the
imperativeness of having a penal code that is not only clear, concise and
effective, but which also reflects current social and judicial attitudes to-
ward justice and individual rights. The present Indiana penal code2 may
be said to violate these ideals frequently.
Reform of the entire Indiana penal code last occurred in 1905.' The
procedure used since that time for modernizing the code has been the
evolutionary process of piecemeal amendment which has been effectuated
by the Indiana State Legislature, whose time for such activity is strictly
limited by virtue of the sixty-day biennial session. Many of the individual
statutes which have undergone this modernization process adequately
reflect contemporary social attitudes" and, therefore, escape criticism
levied against their less defensible bedfellows.' Regrettably, however,
this patchwork treatment has left the present code, when viewed as a
cohesive entity, fraught with defects and disorder which cannot be
remedied by sporadic legislation or judicial interpretation. Of course, to
1. Wechsler, Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1098
(1952).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 9 (Bums 1956 Repl.) (containing material on criminal
procedure) ; IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 10 (containing material on criminal offenses);
IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 11 (containing material on fish and game); IND. ANN. STAT. tit.
12 (containing materials on intoxicating liquors) ; IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 13 (containing
material on prisons and reformatories).
3. The revision was made effective on April 15, 1905 by the Indiana Acts of 1905.
4. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3028-41 (Burns Supp. 1966) (Offenses Against
Property Act). The enactment of these statutes on theft offenses was the first major
revision of a section of the penal code since 1905. These statutes reflect many of the
suggestions made in the MODEL PENAL CODE (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL PENAL CODE].
5. See Foust Some Thoitghts on Criminal Code Revision, 1 IND. LEG. FoRum 4
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Foust].
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expect penal code revision to eliminate all problems encountered in
administration of the criminal law would be naive. Although com-
plexity and obsolescence result in injustice, it does not follow that
simplicity and modernization will eradicate injustice; nonetheless, care-
ful and sophisticated effort would not be unavailing.6
The complexity and volume of material pertinent to penal code
revision places exhaustive treatment of the entire subject or even one
specific area beyond the scope of a single comment. This survey is intend-
ed to accomplish a three fold purpose: to create awareness of why an
obsolete penal code should be revised, by offering examples of the various
ways in which obsolescence may infringe upon individual rights; to refute
some objections presently levied against revision, such as excessive
expense, confusion caused by transition, and adequacy of the present code;
and to suggest various alternative means by which the task of revision
might be initiated and accomplished.
II. WHY REFORM IS NECESSARY
A. Obsolete offenses, penalties and procedures
Much recent material has drawn attention to the obsolescence of
statutes which are particularly repugnant to our sense of fairness.! A
host of statutes particularly susceptible to this line of criticism 's revealed
by a casual survey of Indiana's penal code.
Obsolete statutes may be classified into four major categories: those
failing to reflect the needs of modern times, for example, Indiana's riot
conspiracy statute which allows conviction only if three or more par-
ticipants conspire at night or while wearing white caps, masks or other
forms of disguise;' those in which penalties prescribed no longer fit
the relative seriousness of the crime by modern standards, for example,
a penalty of a one hundred dollar fine and six months in jail for being
found intoxicated in a public place9 or a penalty of a 500 dollar fine and
six months imprisonment for commission of adultery (fornication) by
6. The products of painstaking revision efforts in other states include: ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MIcH. REV. PEN. LAW (Final Draft, West
1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 609 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 40 (1964); N.Y.
REv. PEN. LAW (McKinney 1967). See also MODEL PENAL CODE.
7. See Brumbaugh, A New Crinmnal Code for Maryland, 23 MD. L. REv. 1
(1963) ; Foust, at 4; Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform,-A Look at the
Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 772 (1968); Joost,
The Need for Recodification of the Criminal Laws of Massachusetts, 3 PORTIA L.J.
45 (1967) ; Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REV. 252
(1960).
8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1506 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-611 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
PENAL CODE REFORM
consenting adults ;o those which are no longer enforced, for example,
Indiana's toy pistol statute providing for a maximum penalty of a fifty
dollar fine and twenty days in jail for selling or exposing for sale any
toy cap gun;' and overlapping statutes which provide numerous diver-
gent penalties for the same or similar acts, for example, Indiana's assault
and battery statutes which could conceivably allow a charge to be brought
for the same assault and battery under as many as nine different statutes."
Statutes in each of the foregoing categories pose serious threats to
individual rights. An examination of the most obvious of these threats
will illuminate the absurdity in the assertion that the only harm in obsolete
statutes is the excessive space required in the code book.
B. Threat to Individual Rights
Equal Protection of the Law
There has been little reluctance by the courts to use the equal
protection clause of the federal constitution ' to declare discriminatory
laws unconstitutional. 4 However, the equal protection problem created
by seldom enforced statutes arises at points prior to litigation--when the
decision must be made to arrest an individual for a violation, and when
the decision must be made to prosecute. 5
Outdated and seldom enforced statutes have the serious potential of
becoming tools by which law enforcement agencies, through either in-
advertence or design, can coerce and harass certain individuals. For
example, the only person ever prosecuted under the Georgia income tax
perjury statute was Martin Luther King.' A similar example involved a
"Massachusetts blasphemy statute that had lain dormant for a hundred
years until it was dusted off and invoked against some sympathizers of
Sacco and Vanzetti."'" Obsolete Sunday Blue Law statutes are also
common devices for harassment for racial, religious or economic
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 104207 (Bums 1956 Repl.).
11. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4703 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
12. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-701 to 705 (Burns 1956 Repl.). See Foust, at 23.
13. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. The leading case on the right of an individual to nondiscriminating enforce-
ment and administration of the laws is Yick Wov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74(1886):
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, If it
is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
15. Kartozian, Dead Law--Dead Letter? An Analysis of the Problem of Obsolete
Laws in the Penal Codes of the United States, 2 PORTIA L.J. 75 (1966).
16. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1960, at 1, col. 2.
17. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1928, at 8, col. 1.
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reasons.'
8
Several inadequate defenses appear available to persons subject to
prosecution for these statutes. 9 A denial of equal protection through
discriminatory enforcement might be established. However, not only may
the necessary facts be difficult to prove, but examination of court deci-
sions shows that in many cases the courts do not permit the issue to be
raised as long as the statute remains in the penal code and is therefore
considered the law.2" Another defense conceivably available, but even
less plausible than equal protection, is the doctrine of desuetude.2
Although this doctrine has received some attention in recent years, it is
far from being accepted as valid.22
The general policy of refusal to recognize defenses to violations of
desuetudinal or obsolete statutes is based on the courts' fear of usurping
what is considered the legislative function of repealing statutes. Two
approaches may be suggested which can eliminate inequities without
transgressing such policy. Enactment of a statute recognizing desuetude
as a defense has recently been proposed as a stop gap measure. The statute
would require
a belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense and
18. See, e.g., Rogers & Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IowA L. RaV. 1, 10
(1966). For cases using such laws primarily for harassment purposes see: Bargain
City, U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962); People v. Paine
Drug Co., 39 Misc. 2d 824, 241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe County Ct. 1963), rev'd 16
N.Y.2d 503, 208 N.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 838 (1965) (reversal based on
ground that record failed to support findings of discrimination); Taylor v. City of
Pine Bluff, 226 Ark. 309, 289 S.W.2d 679 (1956).
19. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal
Laws, 61 CoLum. L. Ray. 1103 (1961). The comment deals with the constitutional
threats against equal protection rights arising from penal laws which may be enforced
in a discriminatory manner.
20. A large number of courts have denied the use of the equal protection clause
in discriminatory penal enforcement cases. See e.g., Strand Amusement Co. v. Common-
wealth, 241 Ky. 48, 43 S.W.2d. 321 (1931) (blue laws) ; Society of Good Neighbors v.
Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mfch. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949) (lottery law); People v.
Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 14, 117 P.2d 437, 446 (2d Dists. Ct. App. 1941)
(conspiracy to commit pandering) ; People v. Van Randall, 140 Cal. App. 2d 771, 777,
296 P.2d 68, 72 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (dictum) (gambling violation).
21. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforceinent, 49 IowA
L. REv. 389 (1964) ; Rogers & Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IowA L. REV. 1
(1966). Professor Bonfield would require sufficiently widespread and notorious viola-
tion of the suspect statute to assure that administratve failure to apply it indicates a
clear policy of disregarding its violation in order to raise the defense of unconstitution-
ality due to desuetude.
22. In a recent case, United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
the court held that the defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 956 (1964), by
conspiring to destroy property in a country with whom the United States is at peace,
could not make use of desuetude as a defense unless he could show that non-use of the
statute deprived it of life, and that it was applied in a discriminatory manner against
him. The court seemed to indicate that in certain circumstances desuetude could serve
as a valid defense.
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'reasonable reliance upon a clear practice of non-enforcement of
the statute or other enactment defining the offense by the body
charged by law with responsibility for enforcement,' and the
absence of 'reasonably available' notice of intent to enforce the
statute or other enactment. 3
By far the most logical and needed approach in Indiana, in view of the
basic unfairness to those prosecuted or arrested, in solving the problem
at its point of culmination rather than at its source, is a code revision
which will eliminate the troublesome statutes.
Status Crimes
There has been in the past decade an intense focus on the far-
reaching question of the constitutionality of punishment for so-called
status crimes, 24 such as drug addiction,25 alcoholism,2" and vagrancy."'
The pragmatic importance of recent developments becomes readily ap-
parent when it is observed that in some large cities drunkenness, vagrancy,
and disorderliness account for more than seventy five per cent of the total
arrests made. The basic question affecting revision, readoption or repeal
of status crime statutes is the extent to which the state has an interest in
imposing criminal punishment for a particular status which may or may
not infringe upon the rights of any other citizen.29
Statutes which have 'sought to impose criminal sanctions based
solely on a person's status have been successfully attacked on various
constitutional grounds. For example, in the now landmark case of
Robinson v. California,"0 the court held punishment for the status of
23. Rogers & Rodgers, supra note 18, at 28.
24. See Murtagh, Statis Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36 FORD. L. Rv. 51
(1967).
25. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
26. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Easter v. District of Columbia,
361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Driver v. Hinnant 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
27. See Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966); Fenster v. Leary,
20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
28. PRESmENTS' COmmISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINiSTRATION OF
JusTici, TIE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETv 234 (1967).
29. The determination of whether other citizens rights are infringed upon by
certain conduct depends to a large extent on how harm is defined. "These harms have
been classified in several ways: (a) harms to certain interests or values (against life,
person, property, reputation, habitation, morality, political institutions, the family,
etc.)." J. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDuRE 45-46 (1949). If the state chooses to
define harm in the most liberal sense, then conceivably all conduct could justifiably be
brought within jurisdiction of the criminal process.
30. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). As a result of the recent United States Supreme Court
case of Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), which held that the eighth amendment
prohibition applied in Robinson was not applicable since Powell had been convicted of a
specific "act" of public intoxication whereas Robinson extended only to "status" crimes,
it appears that a broad reading of Robinson had been for the time being curtailed. See
46 3. OF URBAN L. 110 (1968) (discussing the Powell case).
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drug addiction to be violative of the eighth amendment cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition and the Court of Appeals of New York in
Fenster v. Leary31 held the state's vagrancy law unconstitutional as
violative of due process of law. A review of existing Indiana laws which
may be subject to a status-crime classification and a determination of
how a revised code can satisfy legitimate state interests without eliding
constitutional prohibitions are thus essential. At least two statutes in the
present Indiana Penal Code appear vulnerable.
Under the present Indiana statute any person over fourteen years of
age who is able to perform manual labor but has made no effort to do so
and "is found in the state of vagrancy" can be convicted and fined up to
fifty dollars.32 The statute not only provides law enforcement officials
with a tool with which to effect arrests against known criminals, drug
addicts, alcoholics, and prostitutes but also grants them the coercive
power to influence a person to seek work, the thought of which disturbs
our concepts of self-determination.3" An assertion by the New York
court in Fenster is relevant in this context:
The statute violates due process and constitutes an overreaching
of the proper limitations of the police power in that it unreason-
ably makes criminal and provides punishment for conduct . . .
which in no way impinges on the rights or interests of others
and which has in no way been demonstrated to have anything
more than the most tenuous connection with prevention of
crime and preservation of the public order . . . other than,
31. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967). The court stated:
It is also obvious that today the only persons arrested and prosecuted as
common-law vagrants are alcoholic derelicts and other unfortunates, whose
only crime, if any, is against themselves, and whose main offense usually
consists in their leaving the environs of skid row and distrubing by their
presence the sensibilities of residents of nicer parts of the community ...
[I]t seems clear that they are more properly objects of the welfare laws
and public health programs than of the criminal law. . . . If it is only to
allow arrests and criminal prosecution for vagrancy to continue against in-
dividuals such as these. . . . then it must fall. Id. at 315-16, 229 N.E.2d at
430, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 744-745.
The portion of the New York vagrancy statute, N.Y. CODE CR. PRoc. § 887, subd. 1
(McKinney 1954) which was held unconstitutional in Fenster was very smilar to
Indiana's existing statute, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4602 (Burns 1956 Repl.). Fenster was
charged with being "a person who, not having visable means to maintain himself, lives
without employment."
32. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4602 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
33. For a discussion of the many divergent problems and effects created by
vagrancy statutes, see Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1
(1960); Foote, Vagrancy Type Law and its Adininisfiration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 503
(1956) ; Sherry, Vagrants, Rouges and Vagabounds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (1960) ; Comment, Trends in the Law of Vagrancy, 1 CONN. L.
REv. 350 (1968) ; Note, Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV.
782 (1968).
430
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perhaps, as a means of harassing, punishing or apprehending
suspected criminals in an unconstitutional fashion.3
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the con-
stitutionality of vagrancy statutes. However, in a recent case questioning
the constitutionality of the District of Columbia vagrancy statute, Justice
Black dissented from a dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted
and stated that, "I do not see how economic or social status can be made
a crime any more than being a drug addict can be. ''35
The Indiana statute, given its questionable constitutionality not only
on due process and cruel and inhuman treatment grounds, but on grounds
of its probable conflict with the void for vagueness doctrine, should
undergo complete revision. The interests of the citizens and the state must
still be protected by proscribing certain conduct but the prohibited acts
or inaction should be specifically described as including such activity as
loitering to use, sell or solicit drugs, begging, loitering to solicit persons
to commit various sexual acts, and loitering or prowling in a manner
or place under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons
or property in the area. The statute should also provide an opportunity
for the suspect to dispel police suspicion by an explanation of his conduct
and presence. The injection of such specificity into the statute would
diminish status and vagueness difficulties and define for the citizen, the
police officer, and the courts exactly what type of conduct is forbidden
by the state. 8
The problem of devising methods for controlling the growth of
Communist and other subversive groups has long plagued the federal
and state governments.17 Indiana's statutes concerning membership in
subversive organizations38 make membership in an organization engaging
in un-American activity unlawful and provide further that a public
officer convicted of such activity must be immediately discharged.
Indiana's membership statutes" are the only ones in the United States
which do not on their face require knowledge of the organization's
34. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 312-13, 229 N.E.2d 426, 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967).
35. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 257 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
36. Language incorporating the specific conduct Which is prohibited can be found
in the loitering statute adopted in the revised penal law of New York, N.Y. REv. PEN.
LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1967). The void for vagueness aspect of the vagrancy statute,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 4602 (Burns 1956 Repl.), is discussed later in this comment; see
text at note 90 infra. See generally 9 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 1162 (1968) (discussing un-
constitutional vagueness in vagrancy statutes).
37. Z. CHArEa, FaF_ SPEEcH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) ; Sutherland, Freedom
and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1951).
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5204-5207 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
39. Id.
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purposes.4" The grave danger of such statutes was pointed out by the
United States Supreme Court:
But membership may be innocent. A state servant may have
joined a proscribed organization unaware of its activities and
purposes. In recent years, many completely loyal persons have
severed organizational ties upon learning for the first time of
the character of groups to which they have belonged.4
In Scales v. U.S.42 the Supreme Court held that according to the
Smith Act the government must prove the defendant's intent to over-
throw the federal government, and also that he was an active member in
the subversive organization. Although it thus appears that a definite
showing of scienter is a requisite for prosecution under the Smith Act,
the fact that the holding appeared to be based upon statutory construction
makes it unclear whether scienter or mens rea was made a constitutional
requirement for a conviction brought under a state anti-subversive statute.
Conviction under the Indiana membership statutes43 does not depend
on whether the organization appears on any government subversive
organization list or whether the person even knew of the organization's
purposes, and under the public officer statute44 a government employee
may be discharged for mere membership, perhaps inactive, if the head
of the department or agency is satisfied by evidence of membership. The
40. Note, Effectiveness of State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 29 IND. L.J. 492(1953).
See generally IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5201 to 5208 (Burns 1956 Repl.). It is
interesting to note that prior to 1953, the statute prescr-ibing punishment [§ 10-5208]
(one to three years), referred only to the statute concerning membership in such
organizations [§ 10-5204]. The 1952 General Assembly passed an amendment to the
penalty statute [§ 10-5208] stating that there was a typographical error when the statute
was passed in 1951 which made the penalty section refer to the membership statute
[§ 10-5204] rather than to apply only to the unlawful assembly statute [§ 10-5205], as it
was supposed to do originally. The effect of this amendment is that there is now no
penalty prescribed for violation of the membership statute [§ 10-5204] thus making the
whole statute apparently void due to lack of a prescribed punishment. See Rosenbaum
v. State, 4 Ind. 599 (1853) (Crimes and misdemeanors in this state, must be defined
and the punishment therefore fixed, by statute, and not otherwise.).
41. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 188, 190 (1952).
42. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The Court
. . . construed the membership clause, as it had the advocacy clause, that is,
to require as an element of the crime that the defendant specifically intended
to accomplish violent overthrow of the Government. Furthermore, the Court
refused to attribute to Congress the purpose of visiting upon non-active
Party members the heavy penalties imposed by the Smith Act, hence the
statutory term "member" was construed to reach only active members whose
participation in the illegal advocacy of the Party was sufficient to satisfy
established due process standards of criminal imputability.
Comment, The Status of Anti-Communist Legislation, 1965 DUKE L.J. 369, 373.
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5204-5207 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
44. Id. § 10-5207.
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constitutionality of these statutes is therefore suspect, in view of the
possible denial of due process45 and the chilling effect which these
statutes have upon first amendment freedom of speech and right of
association. 6 Furthermore, since the statute banning membership has
no penalty clause," it appears that the statute is simply void as a violation
of the doctrine of nullum crimen sine poena.4 s
A revision of this chapter is necessary to eliminate constitutional
infractions and reflect adequately the true intention and interests of the
state in curtailing the dangers to it of subversion.49
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The historic procedure of piecemeal amendment-or, in many cases,
simple inaction-has produced in Indiana a code of criminal procedure
which is in serious need of complete reform. The present treatment of
search and seizure affords an example. The federal and Indiana con-
45. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The defendant was
convicted of illegal conversion of government property. The trial court had refused to
hear evidence as to defendant's innocent state of mind in believing the property to have
been abandoned. The Supreme Court reversed. While the Court did not rule specifically
on the mens rea requirement, since its reversal was based on the presumption that
statutes carried over from common law brought with them their original mens rea
requirement, the case has at least raised the question of whether mens rea is a con-
stitutional requirement. For a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional questions
regarding mens rea, see Packer, Mens Rea and Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107.
46. The term chilling effect has been used by the United States Supreme Court
to indicate the curtailing effect which an overly broad or vague statute may have upon
exercise of first amendment rights. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
47. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5204 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5208 (Burns 1956 Repl.):
Any person violating any of the provisions of section 5 [§ 10-5205] of
this act shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction, be disen-
franchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of profit or trust
and shall be imprisoned in the Indiana State Prison for not less than one (1)
year nor more than (3) three years.
It may be noted that there is a penalty provided for only [10-5205] of the eight
statutes in the Communism section, IND. ANN. STAT. ch. 52 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
See generally, J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27-69 (1960).
49. It may be noted that while Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), held
the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 4207 (1939), void because of
pre-emption of anti-subversive legislation by the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 19
U.S.C. § 2395 (1964) (commonly termed the Smith Act), the case was later interpreted
by Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), which held that the states may protect
themselves by prosecutions for subversive acts directed against the state itself. In the
recent case of State v. Levitt, 246 Ind. 275, 203 N.E.2d 821 (1965), which affirmed the
validity of Indiana's statutes, the court said:
We must conclude, therefore, that the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court [Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra and Uphaus v. Wyman, supra] do not
hold that the doctrine of preemption is applicable to the state's attempts to
protect itself against subversive activities directed toward the violent over-
throw of the state government.
Id. at 281, 203 N.E.2d at 824.
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stitutions guarantee persons the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."
These guarantees are effectuated through the statutory requirement of the
search warrant which must be issued by a magistrate, upon showing of
probable cause that the warrant should issue and description of a specific
place to be searched." Reading the Indiana statute prompts the erroneous
belief that the law enforcement officers' authority to conduct a search is
limited to occasions where a warrant has been obtained. Such is hardly
the case; an examination of Indiana Supreme Court cases has revealed
that approximately ninety three per cent of the search and seizure cases
decided by the court since 1958 have involved searches without a
warrant.52
The explanation for this dichotomy between statutory authority and
contemporary law enforcement procedure is that the United States Sup-
reme Court and high courts of a majority of states have realized that situ-
ations arise where it is proper for a search to be conducted without first
obtaining a warrant. Although the necessity and wisdom of such excep-
tions to the warrant requirement cannot be denied, 3 it is disturbing that
a practice which is obviously the rule rather than the exception is nowhere
mentioned in the present code of criminal procedure, particularly in view
of cases such as MV1app v. Ohio. 4 Mapp applied the exclusionary rule on
illegally seized evidence to all the states through the fourteenth amend-
50. U. S. CONST. amend. IV, IND. CoNsT. art. I, Sec. 11.
51. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-602 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
H.B. 1057 A which simplifies the procedure necessary for issuance of a search warrant
and updates the terminology used has been passed by the 1969 Indiana General Assembly
and signed into law by the Governor.
52. Examination of all Indiana search and seizure cases was made by the author
as part of an extensive research project.
The difficulty entailed by searches conducted without a warrant was pointed
out in the case of Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) :
An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable
procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search too
likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcoming of hindsight
judgment.
Id. at 96. Cf. L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, JR. & D. ROTHENBERG, DETECrION OF CRImE
122 (1967) (estimated that over ninety per cent of searches involved in later judicial
proceedings are incidents to arrest).
53. In the recent case of Capps v. State, -Ind.-, 229 N.E.2d 794 (1967), the
court recognized that when police had probable cause to make an arrest, an arrest or
search warrant was not required. In Manson v. State, -Ind.-, 229 N.E.2d 801, 803
(1967), the court said that:
It is undisputed that a search of a car without a warrant after a lawful
arrest of one in possession is not constitutionally interdicted. The right to arrest
without a warrant grew out of a need to protect the public safety by making
prompt arrests.
54. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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ment" and has therefore greatly magnified the necessity for establishing
guidelines under which law enforcement agencies can operate. The state's
interest is now two-fold, for not only must it seek to protect freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, but it must-also eliminate illegal police
conduct which may have the effect of allowing a guilty person to go
free as a result of unlawful search. This right of a state to adopt its own
rules pertaining to arrests, searches and seizures was specifically approved
in Ker v. California.6
Examination of recent Supreme Court decisions57 and the related
literature58 reveals that many pertinent questions have been left un-
answered. "9 However, some points have been clarified sufficiently to
allow the formation of procedural guidelines which would reflect the
criteria and reasoning established by the federal and state courts on
various issues. The follow.ing discussion will set forth some of the guide-
lines which might be adopted.
Reform of Indiana's search and seizure statutes would encompass
three specific areas of concern. The first would involve a modernization
and substantial revision of the statute which lists the various items for
which a search can be made and a seizure effected."0 The present list is
55. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1.
56. 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963):
The states are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules govern-
ing arrests, searches and seizures to meet the practical demands of effective
criminal investigation and law enforcement in the states, provided that these
rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmis-
sible against one who has standing to complain.
57. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (search for weapons on less than
probable cause); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrant required
for search of dwelling by housing inspector where consent withheld); Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89 (1964) (propriety of making search without warrant when officers lacked
probable cause to make arrest) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371, 471 (1963) (verbal
evidence obtained after illegal arrest or search must be excluded as "tainted fruit").
58. See Aspen, Arrest and Arrest Altornatives; Recent Trends, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
241; Collings, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-An Amicus Curiae
Brief, 50 CALIF. L. REV 421 (1962) ; Evans, Search and Seizure Incidental to a Lawful
Arrest, 4 Wm. & MARY L REv. 121 (1963); La Fave, Search and Seizure: "The
Course of True Law... Has Not . .. Run. Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255.
59. Examples include whether an officer may search a suspect for weapons without
the showing of probable cause for arrest which was made in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), without first advising the suspect of his Constitutional rights (Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) ; how long an officer may delay making an arrest after
he has probable cause to allow the suspect to reach a location that the officer desires to
search (Harris v. U.S. 331 U.S. 145 (1946) (for discussion of Harris see note
70 infra)) ; and who may give a valid consent to be searched and under what circum-
stances.
60. Subsequent to preparation of this comment, the 1969 Indiana General Assembly
enacted into law House Bill No. 1057 which amends the existing statute [Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 9-601 (Burns 1956 Repl.)] and encompasses a majority of the above suggestions
regarding modernization of the list of items for which a search can be made. House
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long, incomplete and confusing and could be clarified easily and adequately
by permitting search to be made for stolen property, property which it is
illegal to possess, and property that might be used to commit a crime."'
The statute should permit the search for and seizure of mere evidence
which might tend to show that a crime had been committed or show that
a particular person had committed the crime. 2 This provision would
greatly assist law enforcement agencies.
Bill No. 1057 states:
Justices of the peace, judge of any city court, town court or magistrates court
or the judge of any court of record, may issue warrants upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized, to search any ***** place
for the following :****
First. Property which is obtained unlawfully;
Second. Property, the possession of which is unlawful;
Third. Property used or possessed with intent to be used as the means of
committing a crime or offense or concealed to prevent a crime or offense from
being discovered;
Fourth. Property constituting evidence of an offense or tending to show that
a particular person committed an offense.
Fifth. For any child that has been abandoned or neglected or in any
manner left isolated without food, water or adequate shelter, and for any other
purpose necessary to enforce the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to or neglect of
children.
(b) The term "property" as used in this section shall include documents,
books, papers, animals or any other tangible objects. The property described in
this section or any part thereof, may be seized from any place where such
property may be located or from the person or possession or control of any
person who shall be found to have such property in his possession or under
his control.
(c) The term "offense" as used in this section shall include any felony or
misdemeanor or any act which, if committed by an adult, would be chargeable
as a felony or misdemeanor.
(d) The term "place" as used in this section shall include any location where
property as defined herein might be secreted or hidden, including, but not limited
to buildings, persons and vehicles.
61. The proposal of the Committee to Study State Law Pertaining to Criminal
Offenses, Penalties and Procedures in Indiana suggested a similar change to the state
legislature during the 1967 session but the bill was not passed. See, however, note 51
supra.
62. In fairness it should be noted that prior to 1965, it was doubtful whether
states could enact a "mere evidence" rule based on the holding in Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; a few states did adopt such rules and upheld them. E.g.,
People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 158, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965). But in 1967
the Supreme Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), overruled Gouled
and eliminated this distinction in the categories of evidence which may be constitutionally
seized in an otherwise legal search. Justice Brennan writing for the Court said:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction
between 'mere evidence' and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband.
.... Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary
object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, frtit or contra-
band. . . . Indeed, the distinction is wholly irrational, since depending on
the circumstances, the same 'papers and effects' may be 'mere evidence' in one
case and 'instrumentalities' in another. . . . In the case of 'mere evidence'
probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the
evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.
Id., at 301.
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As a second step the probable cause requirement " for issuance of the
warrant should be liberalized at least to a point at which it will no longer
exceed the requirement of probable cause for justifying a search incident
to arrest.6 For as long as it remains easier for law enforcement officers
to conduct a search incident to arrest, or by means of the other exceptions
to the warrant requirement, rather than observing the procedure of
obtaining a warrant, the warrant procedure will continue to be used only
in the rarest of circumstances. This revision should be enacted only to
encourage use of the warrant where it appears reasonable and no attempt
should be made to curtail the effectiveness of the officer in carrying out
his law enforcement functions. "5
The final and most troublesome step would involve setting forth
the various circumstances in which an officer may conduct a search
without having obtained a search warrant." Two exceptions to the
warrant requirement which have been recognized consistently by the
Indiana Supreme Court involve searches incident to a lawful arrest based
on probable cause67 and searches where an emergency situation exists.68
The search incident to a lawful arrest is by far the most widely
used method of conducting a search and therefore should be so described
in the statute as to define adequately permissible activity.6" For example,
63. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-602 (Bums 1956 RepI.).
64. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,480 (1963), the Court said:
Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the in-
formation on which an officer may act are more stringent where an arrest
warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent than when an arrest
warrant is obtained. Otherwise, a principal incentive now existing for the
procurement of arrest warrants would be destroyed.
See the discussion at note 51 supra.
65. For an illustration of the danger in formulating an arbitrary rule that search
warrants must be obtained if time pernfits, and an indication that such a rule is
completely unworkable, see Collings, Toward Workable Rudes of Search and Seizure-
An Amicus Curiae Brief, 50 CAurF. L. REv. 421, 446 (1962).
66. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
67. See Tyler v. State, -Ind.-, 236 N.E.2d 815 (1968) (search of defendant's
auto) ; Peterson v. State, -Ind.-, 234 N.E.2d 488 (1968) (search of the defendant's
auto) ; Wagner v. State, -Ind.-, 233 N.E.2d 236 (1968) (search of the defendant for
narcotics) ; Kirkland v. State, -Ind.-, 232 N.F2d 365 (1968) (search of an auto for
money and revolvers used in robbery); MacGregor v. State, -Ind.-, 231
N.E.2d 241 (1967) (search of a car described by rape victim); Manson v. State,
-Ind.-, 229 N.E.2d 801 (1967) (search of an auto); Moore v. State, -Ind.-, 223
N.F.2d 899 (1967) (search of a dwelling for narcotics); Minton v. State, 247 Ind.
307, 214 N.E.2d 380 (1966) (search of an auto and a dwelling for narcotics).
68. See Machlan v. State, -Ind.-, 225 N.E.2d 762 (1967) (search of an auto
for firearms after an accident) ; Wilson v. State, 247 Ind. 454, 217 N.E.2d 147 (1966)
(search of a dwelling without a warrant during an emergency investigation of a
reported accident); Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954) (search of a
garage and auto). Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
69. For a thorough discussion of search and seizure with and without a warrant,
see La Fave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ...Has Not . . Rut
Smooth', 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 255.
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the statute should describe the permissible scope of the search of the
suspect's person and surroundings at the time of arrest, the extent to
which consent by the suspect or other persons may justify a more exten-
sive search,7" and the extent to which a police officer can hesitate in
making an arrest in order to allow a suspect to reach a location that the
officer desires to search.7'
The emergency situations which arise and require that a search be
made without the delay of obtaining a warrant involve, for example,
moving vehicles which are believed to contain contraband, situations in
which there is a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed or lost and
occasions where the safety of the officer or other persons is jeopardized.72
Terry v. Ohio73 has recently expanded further the possible cir-
cumstances in which officers may search without a warrant and without
probable cause for formal arrest. The Court held that there is no dis-
tinction between a "search" and "frisk" since fourth amendment limita-
tions apply to both, but that searches may be differentiated according to
their purpose and extent. The Court therefore established a rule, based
on the standard of reasonableness enunciated in the fourth amendment,
that a law enforcement officer with less than "probable cause" may
conduct an on-the-street-stop and make a search for weapons if reasonable
suspicions exist to justify the stop and if subsequent to the stop reason-
able belief exists that the person may be armed and dangerous.'4
70. Id., at 279-98.
71. In the case of Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Court held
that search of the defendant's entire four room apartment without a search warrant was
valid since it was a search of area under the defendant's control and made incident to
a valid arrest. Justice Jackson, dissenting, objected to the so-called timed arrest in that
it "leaves to the arresting officer choice of the premises to be searched insofar as he can
select the place among those in which the accused might be found where he will execute
the warrant of personal arrest. Id. at 197.
72. See authorities cited at note 67 supra.
73. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
74. Id. at 33-34. The majority of the Court moved cautiously in its first adventure
into the area of street encounters and framed its holding narrowly:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous; where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquires; and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or other's safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken.
Further, the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the New York stop-and-
frisk law under which the case was handled in the lower courts. Thus, the status of
stop-and-frisk legislation is still in question. Some six states now have such legislation,
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The exceptions to the search warrant requirement raise complex
questions beyond the scope of this comment; obviously a codification of
these exceptions will not eliminate them all. However, several desirable
consequences would justify recodification. The general guidelines estab-
lished by codification would enable law enforcement officers to justify
and, in some cases, refrain from certain types of search activity."5 That
one's rights may be violated by a policeman who is ignorant or scornful
of the intricacies of the constitution is unfortunate; however, it is equally
unfortunate that one who commits an offense may be freed or subject
the state to the expense of a new trial simply because a policeman was
unaware of what search procedures would taint the evidence seized thus
allowing it to be excluded regardless of relevance or probative value.
Also codification of the exceptions would tend to establish a more uni-
form system of search procedure and administration throughout the state,
an ideal which is virtually impossible when the existing guidelines are
hidden in a maze of state and federal court decisions. In addition, publicity
surrounding enactment of the statutes could make more citizens aware
that instances exist when the police must act quickly without a warrant
in order to serve society effectively, thereby curbing some claims of police
overreaching by legislative sanction of the defined procedure.
Void for Vagueness-A Violation of Due Process
A further constitutional infirmity of an obsolete penal code appears
in the form of statutes which are potential violators of the fifth" and
fourteenth amendment77 due process clauses given their inherent vague-
ness or overbreadth. The Supreme Court has declared "that no one may
be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as the meaning
of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
while most other states treat the matter by case law. 53 MINN. L. REv. 652, 657 nA3
(1969). Indiana has very recently joined this group by enacting S.B. 88A in the 1969
Session of the Indiana General Assembly.
For one possible interpretation of the implications of the Terry opinion and for a
thorough discussion of the many problems lying ahead, see La Fave, "Street Encounters"
and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 40 (1968).
75. Conversations with various police officers indicated a general unfamiliarity
with the various ways in which evidence might be excuded at trial simply because the
officer making the search was not familiar with the various standards which must be
complied with for a search without a warrant to be valid. For examples of cases which
were ultimately reversed in the Indiana Supreme Court because of search procedure,
see Dowlut v. State, -Ind.-, 235 N.E.2d 173 (1968); Gasaway v. State, -Ind.-,
231 N.E.2d 513 (1967) ; McCurry v. State, -Ind.--, 231 N.E.2d 227 (1967) ; Machlan v.
State, -Ind.-, 225 N.E.2d 762 (1967) ; Enlow v. State, 234 Ind. 156, 125 N.E.2d 250
(1955) ; Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954).
76. U. S. CONsT. amend. V:
... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; ...
77. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1.
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commands or forbids.""8 The effects of this doctrine have been signi-
ficantly weakened since invariably the courts allow a questioned statute
the benefit of whatever clarification previous decisions may have added.79
The injection of this added procedure into the fair warning doctrine,
requires that a person look not only to the statute to find what the law
prohibits, but also to the many cases interpreting that law. What
is more disturbing is that the person asserting the vagueness defense
is charged with the knowledge, at the time he acted, of the subsequent
interpretation which the state court may apply. Assuming the validity of
the protection and basic underlying philosophy of the fair warning doc-
trine, it is rendered almost meaningless to all citizens except those trained
in the field of legal research."0
The argument is sometimes heard that the fair warning doctrine is
of little or no significance since no one except attorneys ever consult
statutes. Admittedly, this comment is often apt. Crimes such as murder,
rape, robbery and theft are considered morally and socially wrong to such
a universal degree that no assertion can be made that the doctrine would
aid people committing such crimes-persons intent on murder do not
read the penal code first. However, certain activity is of the type that
recourse to the code prior to acting may be reasonable or highly probable.
joining an organization that may have subversive undertones, purchasing
or selling books or literature which appear to be of an obscene nature,
conducting various gambling enterprises of a charitable or commercial
nature and conducting student or political demonstrations without fear
of arrest for disorderly conduct, are examples. Vague or overbroad
statutes make reliance on the code a risk-fraught practice which fact may
cause persons to abstain from possibly legal conduct simply from inability
to determine what is prohibited. Here ignoring the doctrine begins to
parallel the conduct of Roman Emperor Caligula who inscribed laws
on pillars so high that they were impossible to read.
Some courts have imposed upon the vagueness defense the require-
ment that the person must show that the statute was vague as to the
conduct charged, and not just generally vague as to hypothetical cases.82
Statutes concerning violence and destruction of property should be given
benefit of the presumption of constitutionality and not be voided simply
because the defendant can show possible circumstances of questionable
78. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
79. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. Rzv. 67, 73 (1960).
80. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
81. See Rogers & Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IowA L. REv. 1, 3 (1966).
82. See United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
PENAL CODE REFORM
legality because of statutory vagueness. However, statutes which appear
to violate basic freedoms are automatically suspect, should not be pre-
sumed constitutional, and should not defeat a defendant's standing by
inability to show the statute vague as to conduct charged. The possibility
that state courts will fail to make the above distinction, thus allowing a
statute whose chilling effect violates guaranteed rights to remain in the
code, makes it essential that such vague statutes be eliminated or
adequately revised.83
On this score the Indiana statutes on disorderly conduct", are par-
ticularly vulnerable. These statutes have drawn considerable attention in
recent years given the role which they play in current problems involving
civil disobedience and student demonstrations."s Since convictions under
these statutes are rarely appealed, there is an unfortunate dearth of
information as to how trial courts throughout the state deal with alleged
violations. The extremely fine line dividing a person's right to free
speech from possible violations of the present disorderly conduct statutes
places a too heavy burden upon judges to exercise scrutiny and judgment.
The language most susceptible to criticism is "to disturb the peace and
quiet of any neighborhood or family."" Who must be disturbed before
an arrest can be made is not at all clear. For example, if questions such
as whether the conduct must actually disturb a person in the neighborhood
and not merely the arresting officer, whether the disturbance was initially
83. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) :
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
84. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1510 (Bums 1956 Repl.):
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to dis-
turb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual
noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarrel-
ing, challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly
conduct, and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one
hundred dollars [$100], to which may be added imprisonment for not to exceed
sixty [60] days.
85. See Watts, Disorderly Condut Statutes in our Changing Society, 9 Wm.
& MAnY L. REv. 349, 358 (1967). In speaking of the problems created by the various
disorderly conduct statutes Judge Watts indicated that
[t]he answer would be to set forth in the statutes as completely and as
broadly as possible those acts which constitute offenses. The various state
legislatures could very easily enumerate the conduct which in its wisdom should
be criminal, such as failure to obey a lawful command of a police officer
fairly made to prevent a breach of the peace. . . . Conviction under a dis-
orderly conduct statute for loitering on corners is a dangerous area in view
of constitutional safeguards, but it is better for the statute to spell out what
constitutes loitering than to leave it to the whim of the police on the beat.
86. Im. ANN. STAT. § 10-1510 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
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created by the officer's arrival,87 how severe the disturbance must be, and
how much disturbance may be countenanced where such activity is a
routine phenomenon, such as on a university campus, have answers, they
are certainly not found in the statutory language. Similar vagueness
objections may be levied against the somewhat overlapping statute regard-
ing disturbance of public meetings.88
A suggested starting point in undertaking revision of the disorderly
conduct statutes is the format set out in the Model Penal Code which
describes not only the actual types of conduct prohibited, but also the
various degrees of conduct punishable either as a misdemeanor or as a
violation carrying a lesser penalty."
The Indiana vagrancy statute" and the statute concerning mem-
bership in subversive organizations,"' are also suspect, particularly in
view of the total lack of any definition in the former as to what con-
stitutes vagrancy. Such statutes, considering their conspicuous lack of
specificity, may become convenient tools of coercion which can be
used with impunity when the purpose is to harass rather than obtain a
conviction.
Overlapping Statutes
It is frequently asked why the entire penal code should be revised
when revision of only the particularly offensive and obsolete statutes
would be adequate. The most meaningful answer is that piecemeal
amendment of obsolete statutes creates, and since 1905 in Indiana has
created, a body of inconsistent and overlapping statutes. Because of the
limited duration of legislative sessions, amendments to various statutes
are aimed at very narrow and specific issues which call for immediate
attention, and the broad area of law involved is not evaluated. Also
failure to repeal an existing law on the same subject occasionally results.
The types of overlap existing in the present code should serve to illustrate
87. Guidelines should be established for law enforcement officers covering the
permitted response when the officer's arrival and conduct are responsible for the
subsequent disturbance. It should be determined whether an officer can allow an
argument to reach such proportions that his sensibilties are offended, then arrest the
individual for disorderly conduct, or whether he has some affirmative duty to mitigate
the disturbance or at least remove the individual from the area to eliminate disturbing
other individuals or families.
A technique used by many police departments in flammable situations is to remove
potential troublemakers from the area immediately and question their activity in some
other location to avoid creating further disturbance.
88. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1508 (Burns 1956 Repl.) "... molests or disturbs any
collection of persons convened for the purpose of worship; or who thus disturbs persons
attending any agricultural fair or exhibition ......
89. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6.
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4602 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5204 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
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the pressing reasons for forsaking piecemeal amendment as a tool for
reform.
The burglary statutes furnish excellent examples of confusion. There
exist five statutes, carrying penalties from ten days in county jail to
twenty years in the state prison, under which a person entering a dwelling
house intending to commit a felony could be charged and possibly
convicted. The explanation is that amendments to the various 1905
statutes were enacted in 1927, 1941, and 1955, without repeal of the
old statutes which were either paralleled by the new amendments or in
conflict with them. Clarification can be accomplished only by complete
re-evaluation of the offenses to be proscribed and a subsequent redrafting
which clearly and logically defines the true intention of the legislature.92
Especially inconsistent and confusing are the three covering kid-
napping: the first prescribes a mandatory life sentence for one found
guilty of kidnapping," the second prescribes a two to fourteen-year
imprisonment and a fifty dollar to 1,000 dollar fine for carrying off a
child under fourteen years of age with the intent of concealing the child
from his parents ;4 the third statute prescribes a mandatory life imprison-
ment or death sentence for kidnapping or carrying away an individual
with the intent of obtaining a ransom.9"
An illustration of the possible consequent injustice may be noted:
92. Foust, at 23-24.
93. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2901 (Burns 1956 Repl.):
Whoever kidnaps, or forcibly or fradulently carries off or decoys from any
place within this state or arrests or imprisons any person, with the intention
of having such person carried away from any place within this state, unless'
it be in pursuance of the laws of this state or of the United States, is guilty
of kidnapping, and, on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state during life.
94. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2902 (Burns 1956 Repl.) :
Whoever takes, leads, carries, decoys, or entices away a child under age of
fourteen [14] years, with intent to detain or conceal such child from its
parents, guardian or other person having lawful charge or custody of such
child, and whoever, with the intent aforesaid, knowingly harbors or conceals
any such child so led, taken, carried, decoyed or enticed away on conviction,
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars [$50.00], nor more than one thousand
dollars [$1,000.00], and be imprisoned in the state prison not less than two
[2] years nor more than fourteen [14] years.
95. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2903 (Burns 1956 Repl.):
Whoever kidnaps, takes or carries away any person or decoys or entices such
person away from any place in this state, with the intent of obtaining from
any one any money, means, property, or thing of value as a ransom, reward
or price for the return of the person so kidnaped, taken, carried, decoyed or
enticed away, as aforesaid, or whoever shall imprison, detain or hold any
person at any place in this state with the intent of obtaining from any one
any money, means, property or thing of value, as a ransom, reward or price
for the return, liberation, or surrender of the person so imprisoned, detained
or held, shall be deemed guilty of the crime of kidnaping for the purpose of
ransom, and, on conviction, shall suffer death, or be imprisoned in the state
prison during life.
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One who stages a forcible kidnapping but undergoes a change of heart
and releases his victim unharmed within minutes, if found guilty under
the statute, will be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment, the judge
having absolutely no discretion to reduce the sentence regardless of the
circumstances.9" By contrast a person who abducts a two year old child,
intending to conceal the child from his parents and keeps the child for
six months before being apprehended, could be charged under the child
stealing statute and possibly receive the minimum sentence of two years
in jail and a fifty dollar fine."
It is not at all clear from these statutes and pertinent cases under
what circumstances a charge of kidnapping rather than the lesser offense
of child stealing may be utilized by the prosecutor. Revision is necessary
to clearly delineate when an act falls within either kidnapping or the
lesser offense of child stealing. The mandatory life sentence should be
abolished to give more discretion as to what sentence to impose depending
on the circumstances of the case.9" For although the absence of judicial
discretion may serve as an effective primary deterrent, it completely
ignores the benefit of having an effective incentive with which to induce
the safe release of the kidnap victim.
Without purporting to be exhaustive, other areas in the present
criminal code in which difficulties are engendered by overlap include: the
section which prohibits various gambling activity under thirty-two separ-
ate statutes;99 the section on disorderly conduct which contains nine
separate statutes ;100 the section on assault and battery which contains
eleven statutes covering in many cases similar or identical conduct;11
and the section on sex offenses which also contains many overlapping and
inconsistent statutes.10 2
It is thus important to point out that mere existence of overlapping
statutes creates undue confusion to citizens, the accused, prosecutors, and
courts. In addition there looms the potential for violating due process
rights as a result of the warning doctrine's prescription that a person be
96. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2901 (Bums 1956 Repl.).
97. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2902 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
98. See White v. State, 244 Ind. 199, 204, 191 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1963) where the
court speaking of the penalty of mandatory life imprisonment for kidnapping in Indiana
said:
It may be that the penalty provided by the kidnaping statute is too great in
view of the factual situation as herein delineated, and that the legislature
should give some thought to an amendment of that statute, but that is a
function of the legislature, not of this court.
99. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2301-2336 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
100. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1501-1510 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
101. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-401-410 (Burns 1956 Repl. & Burns Supp. 1968).
See also Foust, at 23.
102. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4201-4226 (Burns 1956 Repl. & Burns Supp. 1968).
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aware of the activities which are prohibited by the state. The problem
becomes more pronounced when the various overlapping statutes embody
divergent punishments potentially applicable to a single act." 3
The second problem arising with overlap is the expansive power
given the prosecutor. When possible penalties may range from ten days
to twenty years, depending on the statute under which the prosecutor
chooses to proceed, as in the burglary section,' 0 statutes can become
mockeries of true legislative intention. Gross inconsistencies in penalties
can often be used as a coercive tool to induce a plea of guilty by use of
the plea bargain. 5 Until such time as the plea bargain is subject to more
careful scrutiny and open treatment by the courts and prosecutors, and
until all defendants are supplied with counsel familiar with the mystical
process of the plea bargain routine, eradication of overlap is imperative.'
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS: A SUGGESTED
ADDITION TO THE PENAL CODE
Many doctrines and principles, often more significant of outcome
than the bare statute under which the accused is charged, permeate the
criminal law with varying desirability. These concepts include: respon-
sibility, for example insanity and intoxication; justification, for example
self-defense, and necessity; liability, for example absence of mens rea,
mistake, entrapment and strict liability; and theories of classifications of
crimes and prescription of penalties. The need for re-evaluation and re-
definition to reflect more adequately contemporary philosophies should be
examined.
103. Although clear constitutional argument against the divergent punishments
possible with overlapping statutes has not been successfully raised, their effect can be
analogized to the area of discriminatory enforcement of laws as a denial of equal pro-
tection. The existence of numerous statutes having widely differing penalties applicable
to a single act allows prosecutors to engage in just the type of selection process which
is prohibited when laws are enforced in a discriminatory manner.
104. Foust, at 23-24.
105. See Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining in PRFsmaNT'S COMMISSIN oN
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, TASK FoRcE REPORT: THE
CouRTs 108-19 (1967) (Appendix A); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
106. Although the plea bargain is used in an overwelming majority of cases, lest the
the entire criminal system collapse, the price of expediency is indeed high. For example,
an innocent defendant may be induced to plead guilty to avoid even remote possibiities
of conviction or to escape reputation damaging charges, e.g. pleading guilty to an
assault charge rather than be subject to a morals charge; rehabilitation efforts are
seriously curtailed since the true offense which a particular defendant committed may
never be discovered by the correctional authorities; success in the bargaining process
may depend on the lawyer's reputation and apparent ability to carry out his threats
to take the case to trial; and in many cases the negotiation becomes a controversy as to
how many years a plea is worth rather than what sentencing goals would be most
meaningful.
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Despite their importance, the existing code has treated these issues
in a cursory manner, often omitting them entirely. The desirability of
incorporating a "general provision" section into a revised code deserves
consideration. The fact that all states which have enacted revised penal
codes in recent years... and the American Law Institute"°5 have all adopt-
ed rather exhaustive "general provision" sections indicates a growing
awareness that the basic concepts of the criminal process and not just the
substantive and procedural provisions should be clearly defined and easily
ascertainable. Although each state's enactment is in many ways unique,
all appear to be similar enough in basic content to permit discussion of
them as embodying a single "general provision concept" for purposes of
comparison with the present situation in Indiana and to serve as a model
to aid in formulating such a section.
This task poses a two-fold problem. The absence of many of the
above categories from the present code prevents merely transferring
statutes into a general provision section. Also, it must be determined in
each instance whether the advantages of codification outweigh the occa-
sional value of vagueness and flexibility. For example, the question of
whether the insanity defense should remain a court-made rule, or whether
it should be a function of the legislature to define the appropriate rule "
could pose this problem.10 A brief discussion of suggested chapters will
illuminate some of the advantages and problems inherent in such a task.
A. Basic Principle Provisions
One chapter should contain statutes on geographical jurisdiction;
rules of construction, which need only to be repositioned with minor
changes; statutes on general definitions; statutes of limitation; rules of
107. The states which have recently adopted revised penal codes are: Illinois
(ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 (Smith-Hurd 1964)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. ch.
609 (1964)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 40 (1964)); New York (N.Y. REv.
PEN. LAW (McKinney 1967)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. XLX (1955)).
108. MODEL PENAL CODE Part 1.
109. Although a narrowly drafted statute on the insanity defense may curtail the
adoption of modern psychiatric techniques as they are developed, the existence of the
insanity defense test as a court made rule has produced a disturbing lack of uniformity
throughout the state in its actual application. See language in!ra note 134.
110. Instances where vagueness and flexibility are desirable vary considerably
depending on the concept involved. An example of where vagueness might be more
feasible than in the insanity defense might involve a statute attempting to define the
amount of force a police officer may use to effect an arrest. The MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.07 appears to reach a rather plausible compromise between over-vagueness and un-
warranted specificity by indicating the circumstances where various degrees of force may
be used, for example, no force is justified unless the actor discloses his indentity and
purpose for arrest, also the use of deadly force is not justified when arrest is for a
misdemeanor. This is in contrast to IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-101 (Burns 1956 Repl.) which
states only that an officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest.
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evidence concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, presumptions,
burdens of producing evidence, and affirmative defenses; and ruleg for
multiple offenses, double jeopardy and lesser included offenses which are
now either non-existent or in need of major substantive revision.
The five closely related statutes of limitation,111 could be combined
into one statute for sake of clarity. Also meriting attention is the question
of whether crimes which carry both misdemeanor and felony penalties,
for example seduction,'12 come within the two-year limitation for mis-
demeanors or the five-year limitation for felonies." 3 Thus it is not clear
whether a defendant who neglected to raise in his plea in abatement"4
the defense that the limitation had run for the misdemeanor portion of
an offense, will be deemed to have waived his right to raise this fact in
a post-trial motion if the conviction which results from the charge is held
to be a misdemeanor. As long as multiple offense statutes are deemed
desirable, the applicable time limitation when prosecutions can be brought
must be clearly defined." 5
Crimes or offenses punishable by death or imprisonment in the state
prison are presently classified as felonies, any other offenses are mis-
demeanors." 6 As Dean Foust has noted, classification of crimes based on
place of incarceration rather than on seriousness of the crime creates the
anomaly of having a "twenty-year misdemeanor and a ten-day felony.""' 7
Consideration should be given to reclassifying crimes on the basis of
seriousness. For example any crime punishable by more than one year
might be a felony, anything else a misdemeanor. A further classification
would include very minor offenses, which should be stipulated not to bear
the stigma of a criminal conviction, and should not result in imprisonment.
111. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-301-305 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
112. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4208 (Burns 1956 Repl.):
• .. on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not less than one
[1] year, nor more than five [5] years, and fined not exceedIng five hundred
dollars [$500], or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six [61
months, and fined not exceeding one hundred dollars [$100].
113. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-304 (Burns 1956 Repl.) :
In all other cases, prosecutions for a misdemeanor must be commenced within
two [2] years, and prosecutions for a felony must be commenced within
five [5] years after its commission.
114. In. ANN. STAT. § 9-1129 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
115. California has one possible solution to the dilemma created by statutes having
both misdemeanor and felony classifications. When this problem arises the crime is
considered a misdemeanor until otherwise stipulated by the court. CAL. PEN. CODE §§
17, 799, 800, 801 (West 1968 Supp.).
116. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-101 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
117. Foust, at 17. As a result of classifying crimes on place of incarceration,
statutes which specify neither whether an offense is a felony or a misdemeanor, nor the
place of incarceration, leave in doubt which class of crime the statute intended to create.
See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2801 (public indecency), § 10-1510 (disorderly conduct)
(Burns 1956 Repl.).
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B. Principles of Liability
Numerous unclear and ambiguous terms are presently used to de-
scribe the mental states necessary for liability under various crimes."' A
clear description of the alternative mental states, for example "intention-
ally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "with criminal negligence," as
enacted in the revised New York code" 9 and the Model Penal Code 2' is
desirable. These terms should then be used consistently throughout the
revised code where specific culpability is an element of the offense.
The present code is silent as to the effect of mistake of law and mis-
take of fact. Although the traditional approach holds mistake of law no
defense, a contemporary view suggested by the Model Penal Code'2 '
makes no distinction between types of mistake and considers them valid
defenses if the mistake negatives the mental state which is a material
element of the offense charged. A claim that one did not believe his
conduct constituted an offense is considered an affirmative defense which
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.1
22
C. Principles of Responsibility-Insanity Defense
The effect of mental disorders on criminai responsibility creates
extremely complex questions-in no other area of criminal law are
demonstrably proper answers more difficult to discover. Since only
limited mention of the problem is possible, it may be useful to raise some
of the questions that must be considered before codification is advisable.
An important consideration is the purpose of having the defense
codified.2 and whether it is an affirmative defense, 2 " since it merely
denies the existence of one of the elments of the crime, the mens rea.
118. The following are terms used in the existing penal code to describe the mental
states necessary to the offense; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-601 (corruptly), 10-2103
(designedly), § 10-4510 a (intentionally), § 10-401 (intent to commit felony), §
10-305 (maliciously), § 10-4509 (mischievously), § 10-406 (purposely), § 10-406
(premeditatedly), § 10-3401 (premeditated malice), § 10-301 (willfully), § 10-301
(wantonly), § 10-4708 (with or without malice), § 10-408 (violently), § 10-4514
(fraudulently), (Burns 1956 Repl.).
119. See Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUm. L. REv.
1469, 1481 (1964).
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01-2.02.
121. Id. § 2.04.
122. Id. § 2.04 (4).
123. For discussion of advantages of codification to avoid such conflicts as whether
the McNaughten test allows the jury to hear all relevant testimony regarding defend-
ant's mental impairment, the so-called Modern McNaughten, see note 109 supra.
124. Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It,
49 A.B.A.J. 1075, 1076 (1963). Justice Weintraub suggested that:
Although we sometimes speak of insanity as a defense, it is not a separate
defense to a case the state has otherwise established. Rather it is a denial of an
essential ingredient of the state's case--inens rea.
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Also, consideration must be given to whether mental impairment should
affect determination of guilt, or whether it is relevant only in determining
the disposition of the individual after his act of committing the crime has
been demonstrated by conviction. The suggestion of proponents of this
latter view... that convictions be based solely on commission of the pro-
hibited act, regardless of mental state, and that mental state has relevance
only at final disposition, completely ignores the seriousness of the stigma
of criminality and the fundamental precept that "[o]ur collective con-
science does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame." 2 It
may well be noted that use of the narrow McNaughten test may produce
a quite similar result.1 7
The McNaughten rule is coupled with the irresistible impulse test
in Indiana;... the capacity of a person to distinguish right from wrong,
to comprehend the nature and consequences of his act and sufficiently
unimpaired will power to resist the impulse to commit the act are
determinative. These rules, as in a majority states, were formulated
and adopted by the court rather than the legislature. 29 This legislative
abstention from involvement in the insanity defense places the burden of
modernization and change upon the branch of state government least
capable of performing the task because of inadequate time, money and
staff required to perform the necessary study. Although the recent trend
in some jurisdictions has been to abandon the McNaughten rule 30 and
replace it with tests such as that of the Model Penal Code,12' literature
125. Id., at 1078. Justice Weintraub in asserting that insanity should not affect the
finding of criminal accountability stated:
* * * the little we know suggests that insanity should have nothing to do with
criminal accountability. Rather, we should think of conviction as simply a
determination that the individual has demonstrated his capacity for antisocial
behavior, and that having been proved, we ought then to draw upon medical
knowledge for such help as it may offer in deciding what should be done
with the offender.
126. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
127. By concern with only cognition, regardless of impairment of volition, indivi-
duals in fact blameless could suffer criminal punishment simply because cognition had
not been sufficiently impaired. It may be noted that recently, in United States
v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed a criminal conviction in which the defendant was found not
insane by the United States District Court using the McNaughten Test. In formally
adopting the A.L.I. test, the court rejected the use of McNaughten and found the A.L.I.
test superior to both it and the Durham test.
128. H. WFIHorzN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 141 (1954). See
also note 127 supra.
129. See H. WiHOFEN, supra note 122, at 50-173, for a summary of the insanity
defense tests of all the states and the statutes or cases involved.
130. The most recent jurisdiction abandoning the McNaughten test and adopting
the A.L.I. test was the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680
(7th Cir. 1967), see discussion at note 127 supra.
131. MODE. PENAL CODE § 4.01.
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advocating the validity of the McNaughten rule continues to appear." 2
Objection to the McNaughten test stems primarily from the limits which
it places on testimony of the psychiatrist witness and its emphasis on
only one of the many symptoms of mental disease. Although each test has
its ardent supporters, the real importance of a formal test must be
questioned from the standpoint of juries possibly being unable to dis-
tinguish between the various tests, and of the inherent conflicts between
the concept of insanity as a legal and not a psychiatric term.
Codification of the insanity defense test and related issues133 would
be desirable not only to obtain legislative clarification and expertise but
also to provide necessary uniformity throughout the state. 4 The widely
fluctuating language used by the Indiana Supreme Court in applying the
insanity defense has produced a serious lack of uniformity and raises
questions as to which test is actually followed and what its specific
characteristics are. A thorough study must be undertaken prior to cod-
ification to determine the value and shortcomings of various suggested
rules and the effect on administration of maintaining the status quo or
undertaking a substantive revision. Equally fundamental is the question
of whether a change in the test will have any beneficial effect on the
person suffering the mental impairment: If the treatment and facilities
available for the mentally ill in correctional institutions do not differ
from that in mental hospitals, then it is apparent that merely change and
codification will not create a panacea for the existing problems. Serious
evaluation must therefore be made not only of the insanity defense, but
of the equality of treatment facilities in Indiana penal institutions as well
as mental hospitals.
132. J. Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449-529 (1960); Weintraub,
Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It, 49 A.B.A.J. 1075
(1963) ; Dershowitz, Psychiabry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways,
TRIAL MAGAZINE Feb./March 1968, at 29.
133. Other matters which should be considered include: psychiatric examination to
determine competency to stand trial; effect of diminished responsibility short of legal
insanity; commitment, release or discharge of persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity; and effect of complete cure after a defendant has been committed to a mental
hospital.
134. Prior to 1869, the insanity test was based on the prosecution's inability to
show malice or intent. In Stevens v. Stevens, 31 Ind. 485 (1869) the court adopted a test
similar to Durham, holding an act not criminal when an offspring or product of mental
disease. The court then went to a rather broad form of McNaughten, and made the
insanity test in criminal cases the same as in civil cases. From 1869 to 1904 the court
fluctuated between a narrow and broad irresistable impulse rule. In the 1948 case of
Kallas v. State, 227 Ind. 103, 83 N.E. 769 (1948) the court used the McNaughten and
irresistible impulse tests but said the jury was not in error in ignoring the presence of
sexual impulses to gratify sadistic urges and in finding a sadist, homosexual killer
sane. The court has in many cases used language similar to the Durham test, but
specifically rejected it in Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956).
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D. Principles of Justification
Justification is a defense to conduct that would be considered an
offense were it not authorized or required by statute or necessary to avoid
a public or private harm greater than that sought to be prevented by the
offense charged. This portion of the general provision section would
include codification of the law of self-defense, defense of others and
property, and permissible use of force by police in making an arrest and
preventing escape.
The entire statutory law of justification in Indiana appears in a
proviso to the statute entitled Drawing Dangerous Weapons and states'
"[t]he provisions of this section shall not apply to a person drawing or
threatening to use such dangerous or deadly weapon in defense of his
person or property, or in defense of those entitled to his protection by
law,"'3 5 and in a statute entitled Arrest stating ". . . the officer may use
all necessary means to effect the arrest."' 36 Resorting to the existing code
to determine whether justification is a valid defense to crimes like assault
and battery, manslaughter, murder and the extent to which a person
can defend himself, his family and his property is an exercise in futility.
Although the law can be found by researching Indiana cases, it is
unreasonable to expect laymen to have the expertise to accomplish such a
task." 7
E. Classification and Sanction for Criminal Offenses
In Indiana destruction of a house by fire is punishable by a maximum
of fourteen years imprisonment, 3 ' but destruction of that same house
using explosives carries a three-year maximum sentence." 9 Forging or
counterfeiting instruments that evidence payment of taxes for alcoholic
beverages intending to defraud the state is punishable by a maximum of
one-year imprisonment, 4 ' whereas a banker knowingly making a false
entry in any book or record regardless of whether the entry involved any
substantial amount of money may receive a five-year maximum sentence."'
135. IsND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4707 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
136. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1007 (Bums 1956 Repl.).
137. See BusINESS WEEK, Aug. 5, 1967, at 113 (Weekly feature "Personal
Business"). The increased interest of the average citizen in protecting himself, his home
and family due to rise in crime and riots was indicated by an article entitled "A Memo on
Self-defense." The two page article discussed in laymen's language the law of self-
defense in capsule form. A criminal code should be clear and complete enough to
serve the same function should persons resort to it for guidance.
138. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-301 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
139. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-305 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
140. IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-607 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
141. IN n. ANN. STAT. § 10-1713 (Burns 1956 RepI.). For further examples of
disproportionate penalties, see Foust, at 29. This statute is particularly objectionable
since there are no degrees of the offense listed as in the theft or burglary sections
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Piecemeal amendment over the last sixty years has created a sentencing
structure which in many cases bears little or no resemblance to the
relative seriousness of the offense."4 2
An overwhelming majority of penal statutes in Indiana provide for
both a fine and imprisonment; however, absolutely no legislative guide-
lines are provided as to when one or the other or both sanctions should be
used. Determination of why punishment is needed and the proper sanction
to fulfill that need is left entirely to the judge. The difficulty of this task
is exemplified by such questions as whether society is properly served by
imprisoning a bank executive for making a false entry, or whether any-
thing but contempt for the law is fostered by imposing a 100 dollar fine
upon a poverty-stricken ghetto dweller for public intoxication or dis-
orderly conduct.
Suggestion by the President's Commission.4 . and adoption by the
Model Penal Code.4 and the New York Revised Penal Code 5 indicates
the desirability of grouping offenses into major categories to enable
delimiting permissible sentences. For example, felonies and misdemeanors
could be each divided into three degrees of seriousness; first, second and
third degree. Each degree of offense would then be assigned an applicable
range of punishment in terms of fine, imprisonment or both. All criminal
statutes would then indicate merely the degree of the offense involved,
thus, prescribing the same range of punishment for all offenses, for
example all those classified as second degree felonies. Further classifica-
tion could include minor offenses, which would carry no label of crim-
inality and only a monetary sanction. The clarification and ease of admin-
istration that such a system would necessarily produce would be a major
improvement.
IV. CURRENT OBJECTIONS TO PENAL CODE REVISION
Advocacy of disruption of the status quo seems inevitably to prompt
widely divergent objections to the proposed change. Some objections
depending on the seriousness of monetary harm caused. Therefore, a false entry of
only five dollars results in a felony conviction and a maximum of five years imprison-
ment
142. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE TASic FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 15 (1967).
In its discussion of sentencing structure of penal codes in most states generally the
Commission found:
As a result the sentencing distinctions among offenses are in excess of those
which could rationally be drawn on the basis of the relative harmfulness of
conduct or the probable dangerousness of the offender.
Id. 15
143. Id.
144. MODEL PENAL CODE Part I, art. 6.
145. N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW §§ 55.00 to 80.15 (McKinney 1967).
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levied against penal code reform are more meritorious than others, and
it is essential that at least the more frequently heard complaints be dis-
cussed, particularly since cooperation of persons who must use the code
is vital. The unfortunate effect of non-acceptance is exemplified by
experience with the various state divorce codes which shows that the
reduction, addition or revision in the grounds for which divorce can be
granted has little or no effect on the actual divorce rate.""6
Complete avoidance of confusion during transition is not possible.
Affirmative plans initially to reduce the confusion to workable level are
necessary. One suggestion is not to attempt simultaneous reformation
of the substantive, procedural and correctional sections but concentrate
on enacting one such section at a time. In this way the entire criminal
process is not at once exposed to a new system of administration. From
a study of the states which have recently enacted revised penal codes, 4
and states now in the process, " " it appears that this approach is followed
in a majority of cases. Perhaps the most effective and logical means of
eliminating the problems of transition is to follow the procedure used by
the New York legislature. The New York Commission on Revision
decided that "[i]n order to allow the judiciary and the legal fraternity
and law enforcement agencies ample opportunity to study and familiarize
themselves with the new law,"'4 9 the code would not become effective
until more than two years subsequent to enactment. Any changes found
necessary during such an interval as a result of meritorious suggestions
can be incorporated without significant effect on the administration
process while the old code remains in effect.
The Criminal Offenses Committee in Indiana was created to study
the laws relating to criminal offenses, penalties and procedures.' 0 The
committee reports, while recognizing the desirability of complete revision
of all existing criminal laws, advised that this goal was not now possible
because of inadequate financial assistance. Although exploration of the
intricacies of code revision economics lies beyond the scope of this com-
ment, it may be useful to discuss some general concepts of financing to
146. Reinstein. Divorce and the Law in Germany: A Review, 65 Am. J. of
Sociology 489 (1960).
147. See note 107 supra.
148. E.g., California (Cal. Joimt Leg. Comm'n For Revision of the Penal Code,
Penal Code Revision Project (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1, 1967; 2, 1968)) and Michigan
(Mich. Rev. Crim. Code (Final Draft, West 1967)).
149. Memorandum of the Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal
Code on the Penal Law, 39 N.Y. Ray. PEN. LAw xxxi (McKinney 1967).
150. This committee was created as a result of an amendment to Chapter 20,
Indiana Acts of 1963 to study a broad range of subjects in the field of criminal law,
and recommended legislation in seventeen areas. Many of the proposed bills were not
innovations in the law, but rather an updating of existing criminal statutes.
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determine whether anticipated costs, now deemed prohibitive, might be
re-evaluated in terms more favorable to total revision. By use of an
elementary benefit-cost analysis, it may be possible to show that the
basic cost of total revision is substantially offset by long term financial
savings resulting from adoption of a revised penal code.
It is often observed that
economic criteria for decision-making are abstruse theoretical
postulates invented and circulated by academic professional
economists, or at best, that economic analysis is suitable only
for application to idealized situations that have little relation
to the real world. 5'
These criticisms of economic analysis are of questionable validity; more-
over, the tool may be used in the present context not to yield answers to
actual policy problems, but merely to create an awareness that factors
exist which are relevant beyond the mere primary cost of revision.
The cost of crime has been growing rapidly, as shown by the
President's Commission indicating that from 1955 to 1965 annual public
expenditure for dealing with crime, including police, courts, prosecution
and correction institutions, has gone from 2.2 billion dollars to approxi-
mately 4.6 billion dollars.' 52 These costs must be borne heavily by the
states, Indiana being no exception.'53 Moreover, while in themselves
staggering, these figures do not portray the total picture, for they fail to
consider any of the external costs to society. External costs include such
items as decreased use of public facilities at night, and failure to invest
in businesses in high crime areas.'5 It can be shown that a total revision
151. J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DE HAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: EcoNoMiCs,
TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY 358 (1960).
The above quote is a reference by the authors to the critics of economic analysis
and is not the viewpoint of the authors.
152. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMFENT AND ADINISTRATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN
ASSESSIENT 55 (1967).
153. See Penegar, Appraising the System of Criminal Law, Its Processes
and Administration, 47 N.C.L. REv. 69 (1968).
154. Id., at 114-117. A summary description of such external (secondary) cost
states that:
People stay behind locked doors of their homes rather than risking walking in
the streets at night. Poor people spend money on taxis because they are
afraid to walk or use public transportation. Sociable people are afraid to talk
to those they do not know. In short, society is to an increasing extent
suffering from what economists call opportunity costs as the result of fear of
crime. For example . . . . officials interviewed . . . report that library use is
decreasing because borrowers are afraid to come out at night. School officials
told of parents not daring to attend P.T.A. meetings in the evening, and park
administrators pointed to unused recreational facilities. When many persons stay
at home, they are not availing themselves of the opportunities for pleasure
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of the existing penal code will have some effect in reducing the cost of
crime and these savings must be considered in determining the true cost
of revision. The following measures while neither exhaustive nor cate-
gorically recommended are possible ways by which the cost of crime could
be reduced.
Recent literature indicates the feasibility of completely eliminating
from the criminal process certain activity now subject to penal sanction.'55
The basic premise of the criminal law is that when activity is sufficiently
harmful to society, it becomes desirable to control it through the criminal
rather than the civil legal system. Therefore some of the so-called victim-
less crimes which are felt to harm no one except the consenting actors
might be removed. These crimes include prostitution, 5 ' certain gambling
offenses," 7 drug use offenses,' 58 fornication and homosexuality between
consenting adults,' 8 drunkenness or alcoholism 6 and abortion.' 6 ' The
substantive changes would reduce the task of the police, prosecutors and
courts, thereby reducing the cost of the system and permitting the
devotion of more resources to coping with crimes which directly harm
and cultural enrichment offered in their communities, and they are not visiting
their friends as frequently as they might. The general level of social inter-
action in the society is reduced.
Id., at 116.
155. Perhaps the most thorough and scholarly work on this entire subject is
Herbert Packer's recent book, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. The exhaustive
treatment given this entire area by Professor Packer obviates treatment in depth of
whether certain crimes should be removed from the criminal process.
156. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 328-31 (1968). In
questioning the validity of using the criminal process to deal with prostitution, Professor
Packer asks:
What does society gain from this kind of law enforcement activity? If the
effort is to stamp out prostitution, it is plainly doomed to failure. If it is to
eradicate or curb the spread of venereal disease, that too is illusionary, given
the sporadic pattern of enforcement . . . . To put it crudely but accurately,
the law is perverted to serve goals for which it was never intended.
Id. 331.
157. Id. 347-54.
158. Id. 332-42. Regarding the use of the criminal process to curb and handle the
problem of narcotics and other drugs. Professor Packer states rather forcefully that
"[a] clearer case of misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to
imagine." Id. 333.
159. Id. 301-12.
160. Id. 345-47.
161. Id. 342-44. The statistics which show that of the approximately one million
abortions which are performed in this country each year, only about one per cent of these
were performed in hospitals, has caused Professor Packer to indicate that:
[t]he conclusion seems irresistible that the only way to eliminate the illegal
abortionist is to eliminate the illegal abortion, and to substitute for it a
narrowly drawn criminal prohibition addressed to the real secular evil of
abortion performed by unqualified practitioners, leaving to the evolving mores of
the medical profession the determination of the circumstances under which its
skills will be mobilized to perform abortions.
Id. 344.
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society. Also, agencies such as welfare, social, religious, and clinical
bodies could handle these problems more effectively than can the courts.
The President's Crime Commission has estimated that national
average daily cost for keeping an individual on probation is less than
forty cents, while the daily cost per prisoner in a correctional institution
is over five dollars." 2 This rather pragmatic observation emphasizes the
fact that legislative apathy toward a sometimes antiquated and illogical
sentencing structure is not without financial consequence.
Since Indiana's penal code is in need of not only formal revision
but also substantive revision, 8' it is essential that the philosophy of
punishment be re-evaluated. Preparatory to any meaningful substan-
tive revision, the purpose for attaching a certain degree of punishment to
a given act, the extent to which judges should be limited by prescribed
inflexible ranges of punishment and the means of punishment to be
employed must be determined. While this determination is primarily
important as the axis upon which the entire revision process must turn,
its effect upon costs also merits consideration. If it is found that certain
criminal offenses can be satisfactorily dealt with by shorter prison terms,
combined with better probation and release programs that will have
positive rehabilitative effect, and increased use of fines for types of crimes
whose primary function is deterrence,'64 such as strict liability crimes,
certain white collar crimes, and gambling, the state will realize sizable
savings.
After determining revision to be at least in some respect desirable,
and after determining its scope with respect to substance, procedure and
correction, the benefit-cost analysis may be utilized.'65
Tangible costs 66 should be ascertained by considering: estimated
162. Penegar, supra note 153, at 117.
163. The term "formal revision" includes such operations as systematic bringing
together of statutes and parts of statutes relating to the same subject and arranging them
in logical order; eliminating obsolete, unconstitutional, impliedly repealed and duplicate
provisions, elimination of unecessary words; and rectifying conflicts which have arisen.
164. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. OF POL.
EcoN. 168 (1968). This rather unique article contains an interesting approach to the
increased use of fines throughout the entire criminal process to serve the same deterrent
function as imprisonment but at the same time compensate the state and society for the
actual monetary cost caused by the crime.
165. For general discussion of the basic mechanics of a traditional benefit-cost
analysis see J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 29 et. seq. (1968).
166. Two separate concepts of benefits and costs are considered under the
traditional benefit-cost analysis-tangible items which can be quantified in monetary
terms, and intangible items which are not subject to monetary quantification but have
real value in satisfying human needs or desires.
A second classification concerns primary benefits and costs, which flow directly
from the revision project, and secondary benefits and costs which are indirectly
attributable to the project, for example decreased business investment in a neighborhood
having a high crime rate.
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time for completion; size and make-up of committees; cost of hiring part
time and full time reporters, consultants and researchers; printing and
distribution costs for tentative and final drafts; and applicability of work
already completed by recently revised codes of other states as well as the
Model Penal Code.
Tangible benefits expected from the revision should then be deter-
mined to the fullest extent possible. Areas to be considered involve:
increased use of probation as opposed to imprisonment; decrease in police,
prosecutor and court cost by removal of certain activity from the criminal
process entirely; decrease in recidivism resulting from improved reha-
bilitative programs; and more effective use of law enforcement agencies
resulting from more definite description of what constitutes criminal
activity and guidelines for acceptable police response.
Since the tangible costs will obviously exceed the monetary benefits
to be expected from the revision process, it is then necessary to look to
intangible benefits, such as: increased protection of citizens' constitutional
rights; clear definition of conduct prohibited by the state to satisfy the
fair warning doctrine and also elimination of the chilling effect caused
by vague statutes; and increased respect for the law resulting from a
more equitable system. The legislature must determine the extent of its
responsibility to subsidize attainment of these intangible benefits. If that
duty is adjudged at least roughly comparable to the pecuniary difference
between tangible costs and intangible benefits, revision is desirable.
Absence of mathematical precision is not crucial; the analysis merely
emphasizes that considerations beyond the cost of revision should be
considered in determining the project's feasibility.
V. CONCLUSION
Small reforms, it has been remarked, are the enemy of great reforms.
Piecemeal amendment of Indiana's penal code is the enemy which com-
plete reform must face. Apathy toward the criminal law, alleged lack of
adequate time and money, and occasional reform of a pa-ticularly unjust
law to meet an immediate crisis, are formidable obstacles in the path of
complete reform. Fortunately, the task is not impossible, for since 1942
when Louisiana made the first major revision of penal law in this century,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois and Wis-
consin have in varying degrees accomplished major reform, along with
states like California, Michigan and Texas whose efforts should add
them to that list in the near future. Rising cost of crime and subsequent
costs in dealing with criminals, increased pressure by the United States
Supreme Court in protection of constitutionally protected rights, and the
increasing dissatisfaction with the obsolete code now in existence, are
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placing burdens and pressures on our enforcement personnel and legis-
latures which cannot continue unnoticed and uncorrected.
Increasingly widespread use of modern technology in the legal system
must be included in an overall consideration of reform. Presently, com-
plete text of the entire statutory laws of nine states, the United States
Code, the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations, all Pennsylvania
Supreme and Superior Court cases since 1960, all Third Circuit, Second
Circuit and United States Supreme Court cases since 1950, and decisions
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, are on computer
tape.117 Due to the innovation of full text indexing,16s a computer, given a
properly phrased question, can search the code and print out relevant
statutes on the problem involved with speed and accuracy impossible under
the traditional manual approach. The accuracy of a search by such modem
techniques depends to a great extent on the clarity, and absence of overlap
and ambiguity in the statutes used. The overwhelming presence of these
undesirable characteristics in the existing penal code makes contempla-
tion of use of these modern time saving devices in Indiana highly
unrealistic. The impending advent of computers in the legal system
increases the need for eliminating the so-called diseases of language from
the statutes and codes so that the most effective use can be made of these
devices. These considerations become even more important in terms of
formulating a completely revised code.
Richard C. Lague
167. See Comment, Computer Retrieval of the Law: A Challenge to the Concept of
Unauthorized Practice?, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1261, 1265 (1968) for a more detailed
description of the use and advantages provided by such a computer system.
168. See id., at 1265-69 for an explanation of full text indexing, and various
modifications of that system.
